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NOTES
HEADS OR TAILS: THE EMPLOYEE
POLYGRAPH PROTECTION ACT
Polygraph them all. I don't know anything about polygraphs and
I don't know how accurate they are, but I know they'll scare the hell
out of people. 1
Apparently, private employers in the United States heeded this advice.
While the utility of the polygraph2 in the employment setting remains as
unreliable as flipping a coin, 3 use of the device among private employers has
escalated since 1978 to a current annual level of approximately two million
"lie detector" exams.4 Employers expanded administration of the test5 from
investigations of specific instances of wrongdoing to periodic surveys and
1. 133 CONG. REC. H9533 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987) (statement of Rep. Brooks from
Texas quoting former President Nixon on polygraphs and the Watergate tapes); Comment,
The Polygraph and Pre-Employment Screening, 13 Hous. L. REV. 551, 561 n.69 (1976).
2. One commentator has defined the polygraph in the following terms: The polygraph
consists of a blood pressure device that measures heart rate and blood pressure; a
pneumograph, a tube fastened around the subject's chest and abdomen that measures
the rate of breathing by monitoring expansion of the chest and abdomen; and elec-
trodes fastened to the subject's index and ring fingers that monitor the variations in
the flow of electrical current through the subject's body.
Hurd, Use ofthe Polygraph in Screening Job Applicants, 22 AM. Bus. L.J. 529, 530 (1985). For
purposes of this Note, the terms "polygraph" and "lie dectector" are used interchangeably.
3. Comment, supra note 1, at 555; see Note, Lie Detectors in Private Employment: A
Proposalfor Balancing Interests, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 932, 935 (1965) (citing Hearings on
the Use of Polygraphs as 'Lie Detectors' by the Federal Government Before the Subcomm. on
Foreign Operations and Government Information of the House Comm. on Government Opera-
tions, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 157-58 (1964)).
4. See Note, Lie Detectors In the Workplace: The Needfor Civil Actions Against Employ-
ers, 101 HARV. L. REV. 806 (1988); Letter from American Federation of Labor and Congress
of Industrial Organization to Pat Williams (Oct. 30, 1987), reprinted in 133 CONG. REC.
E4349-50 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987). Government use alone rose from administration of 7,000
exams in 1973 to 23,000 in 1982. Wiseman, Invasion By Polygraph: An Assessment of Consti-
tutional and Common Law Parameters, 32 ST. Louis U.L.J. 27, 28 (1987).
5. This expansion grew out of a belief among employers that inserting a metal box into
the wall would rid the workplace of all the "undesirables." See Hermann, Privacy, The Pro-
spective Employee, and Employment Testing: The Need to Restrict Polygraph and Personality
Testing, 47 WASH. L. REV. 73, 134 (1971); Gardner, Wiretapping the Mind: A Call to Regu-
late Truth Verification in Employment, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 320 (1984).
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preemployment screening,' arguably, to intimidate employees, rather than to
determine culpability for a specific violation of law or company policy.7
Recognizing the inherent unreliability of the polygraph,' and its degrada-
tion of human dignity and privacy, 9 President Reagan signed the Employee
Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (Polygraph Act or Act) into law on June
21, 1988.' ° The statute became effective on December 12, 1988.11
In order to eliminate widespread use of the polygraph, the Act directly
prohibits the use of lie detectors during private employment application pro-
cedures and as a means of randomly evaluating current employees. 12 Fur-
thermore, the Act restricts the use of lie detectors in ongoing theft
investigations, except where "reasonable suspicion" exists.' 3 The Polygraph
Act exempts from coverage governmental employers, national defense and
security employers, the FBI, and employers involved in the manufacture,
distribution, or dispensation of controlled substances. 4
6. Hurd, supra note 2, at 533; S. REP. No. 284, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 41, reprinted in
1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 726, 728 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 284]. Employers
seeking to rationalize widespread use of the polygraph claim not only that the device reduces
the time needed for background searches prior to hiring, but that it is a useful tool in reducing
theft as well. Comment, supra note 1, at 551.
7. Comment, supra note 1, at 561; Carr, Employer Use of the "Lie Detector'" The Arbi-
tration Experience, 35 LAB. L.J. 701, 704 (1984) (The Privacy Protection Study Commission,
established under the Privacy Act of 1974, found the polygraph to be humiliating, coercive,
and little more than an intimidating device).
8. See 133 CONG. REC. H9529 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987) (statement of Rep. Wheat). The
Office of Technology Assessment concluded that the reliability of the polygraph as a condition
of employment was 85% at best. Further studies indicate that approximately 260,000 people
are erroneously labeled liars while 120,000 deceptive individuals walk away free. 134 CONG.
REC. S 1703 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); see S. REP. No. 284, supra
note 6, at 42 ("It has been determined that even assuming an extraordinary 95% degree of
accuracy with such tests, in every population of 1,000 examinees, 47 innocent people will be
labeled guilty even though they are in fact innocent."), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 730. But see Note, supra note 4, at 813 (estimating that the number of
people falsely diagnosed as liars may only be as high as 40,000).
9. 133 CONG. REC. H9545 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987) (statement of Rep. Weiss quoting the
American Medical Association); Hermann, supra note 5, at 152.
10. The Conference Committee reported the Polygraph Act on May 26, 1988. H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 659, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 726, 749 [hereinafter H.R. CONF. REP. No. 659].
11. The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (Polygraph Act or Act), Pub. L. No.
100-347, 102 Stat. 646 (1988) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009).
12. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2002 (West. Supp. 1989).
13. Id. § 2006(d); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 659, supra note 10, at 12, reprinted in 1988 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 751.
14. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006. While allowing the use of the polygraph in limited instances, the
Act places certain restrictions on even these uses. See infra notes 149-215 and accompanying
text.
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This Note first traces the regulation of polygraph use in the workplace
prior to federal legislation through collective bargaining agreements and
state statutory circumscription. Next, it describes the Polygraph Act of
1988. Examining how the polygraph works, this Note discusses the accu-
racy debate surrounding the polygraph and evaluates the impact of this leg-
islation on private industry, by analyzing compliance problems employers
may experience and the inherent inconsistencies in the Act. Furthermore, it
assesses potential sources of litigation that the exemptions and restrictions
under the Act may breed. Finally, this Note concludes that Congress' at-
tempt to provide fairness to employees and establish a system of uniform
polygraph usage among employers through enactment of the Polygraph Act
fails to account for the polygraph's unreliability and may actually intimidate
employers.
I. THE PATCHWORK QUILT: THE LACK OF UNIFORMITY
AMONG STATES
A. Labor Arbitration
Most law regarding the use of the polygraph in the workplace developed
within the field of labor arbitration. 5 Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 16 employers could legally establish in-house rules requiring the use of a
lie detector without committing an unfair labor practice.' 7 However, when
an employer's desire to polygraph employees departed from legitimate man-
agement concerns and became aimed at union support or other protected
activity, the use of a polygraph constituted an unfair labor practice."'
Although employers could administer a lie detector in ongoing investiga-
tions,' 9 management had to first fulfill its duty to negotiate with the union.
In Medicenter, Mid-South Hospital,2 ° the National Labor Relations Board
15. Note, Lie Detectors in the Employment Context, 35 LA. L. REV. 694, 697 (1975);
Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111, 115 n.7 (W. Va. 1984). Although
arbitration decisions were not viewed as binding precedent, they provided insight into the ex-
tent of acceptance in the private sphere, as well as into justifications, or lack thereof, for poly-
graph use. Hermann, supra note 5, at 92. Typically, where a state statute did not exist, focus
shifted to the collective bargaining agreements of unionized industries. See infra notes 16-25
and accompanying text; Note, supra note 3, at 940-41 (nonunionized individuals must resort to
other means of protection); but see Hermann, supra note 5, at 94 (arguing that polygraph use
in a nonunionized setting was unconscionable due to the superior bargaining power of the
employer); Hurd, supra note 2, at 541.
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1982).
17. Craver, The Inquisitorial Process in Private Employment, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 30
(1977).
18. See id. at 30-31.
19. Id. at 32.
20. 221 N.L.R.B. 670 (1975).
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(NLRB) held that a rule requiring submission to a lie detector test was a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining affecting the "terms and condi-
tions of employment. ' 21 Thus, an employer's refusal to bargain on this sub-
ject could have led to a charge of unlawful failure to bargain in good faith.
22
Despite the employers' ability to legally bargain for, and thus prescribe
polygraphing, arbitrators consistently held inadmissible evidence acquired
through use of a lie detector.23 However, where outside corroborative evi-
dence of employees' asserted improprieties existed, and the polygraph results
did not constitute the sole evidentiary basis for the disciplinary action taken,
some arbitrators admitted the evidence. 24 Alternatively, some arbitrators
limited the use or weight accorded the evidence.2 5
Despite the fact that much of the law regulating use of the polygraph in
the workplace developed in the field of labor arbitration, 26 collective bar-
gaining afforded minimal protection to employees against polygraph exami-
nation. 27 The employers' use of a lie detector in the preemployment setting
laid outside the realm of mandatory bargaining subjects and thus was not
21. Medicenter, 221 N.L.R.B. at 678; Nagle, The Polygraph in the Workplace, 18 U.
RICH. L. REV. 43, 66 (1983). But see Hurd, supra note 2, at 541.
22. Nagle, supra note 21, at 66; 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). Under section 158(a)(5), an
employer could require polygraph testing where bargaining resulted in an impasse or where
the union passed up the opportunity to bargain on the topic. Craver, supra note 17, at 32;
Castagnera-Cain, Defamation, Invasion of Privacy, and Use of Lie Detectors in Employee Rela-
tions - An Overview, 4 GLENDALE L. REV. 189, 206 (1982).
23. Craver, supra note 17, at 34. Because of the polygraph's inherent unreliability, most
arbitrators balanced the employer's interests against the employees' interests in favor of the
employees. Id. at 40. Thus, arbitrators did not discipline employees for refusing to submit to
an exam. Id.
24. See Comment, supra note 1, at 557-58; Carr, supra note 7, at 707 (citing Brinks, Inc.,
78-1 ARB 8236 (a polygraph could be used as a corroborative variable, but where the poly-
graph was the only available evidence, it was too unreliable)). But see Note, supra note 3, at
942:
A lie detector test [was] admissible on the ground that polygraphic testing ha[d]
become a more or less recognized and established mechanism of adjunct utility in
personnel administration. Thus, it [could have] become a factor of evidence in the
broad searching for the facts that generally [was] possible at an arbitration hearing
where rules of evidence are not controlling.
Id. (quoting Town & Country Food Co., 39 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 332 (1962)).
25. Note, The Working Man's Nemesis - The Polygraph, 6 N.C. CENT. L.J. 94, 96 (1974).
Ultimately, however, arbitrators did not hold that the lie detector could not be used in certain
circumstances, but rather as a threshold matter there must have been "at least [a] basis for a
formal accusation against the subject." General American Transp. Corp. v. United Steelwork-
ers Local 1133, 31 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 355, 364 (1958). Furthermore, a polygraph requirement
was seen as an unwarranted extension of management rights infringing on individual privacy,
absent a specific bargaining agreement. Note, supra note 15, at 698 (citing Town and Country
Food Co., 39 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 332, 335 (1962)).
26. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
27. Hurd, supra note 2, at 541.
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embraced by collective bargaining agreements.2" Additionally, even where
unions successfully bargained against such use, "such nonmonetary objec-
tives [were] the first to be conceded by labor."29 Furthermore, labor regula-
tion of polygraph testing appeared inapplicable to nonunionized
employees.3" Thus, the inherent limitations of labor arbitration and agree-
ments, as well as the problematic techniques employed by employers, trig-
gered state legislation on polygraph testing.3 1
B. State Statutory Circumscription of Polygraph Testing
32
Widespread denunciation of polygraph testing prompted statutory cir-
cumscription at the state level.33 Legislation at the state level had taken two
forms. First, statutes regulated the exam itself, either banning or restricting
polygraph usage.34 Second, statutes regulated the scope of the questions per-





31. Gardner, supra note 5, at 310.
32. Although not separately addressed in this Note, it should be noted that a tort action
based upon a common law right of privacy may be brought as a result of an employer
administering a polygraph. This right has been codified in the First Restatement of Torts.
Wiseman, supra note 4, at 57-60. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides in relevant part:
(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the
resulting harm to the interests of the other.
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion
of another, as stated in § 652B; or (b) appropriation of the other's name or
likeness, as stated in § 652C; or (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's
private life, as stated in § 652D; or (d) publicity that unreasonably places the
other in a false light before the public, as stated in § 652E.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). The Restatement further provides:
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclu-
sion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person.
Id. § 652B.
The following states have adopted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652, which
provides a common law right of privacy: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Iowa,
Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. The District
of Columbia also adopted this provision.
33. Gardner, supra note 5, at 310. Because the provisions of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151-168 (1982), apply only to unionized employees, statutory provisions
provided needed protection for the nonunionized.
34. Wiseman, supra note 4, at 61-62; Hurd, supra note 2, at 542.
35. Wiseman, supra note 4, at 62; Hurd, supra note 2, at 542.
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Prior to the passage of the Polygraph Act, in attempting to regulate the
scope of polygraph exams, some states prohibited the use of lie detectors in
the workplace.36 Some statutes merely prohibited employers from demand-
ing or requiring a test;3 7 others prohibited employers from even requesting
that employees submit to an exam.38 Where statutes allowed employers to
"request" submission to a polygraph, problems of abuse occurred.
Clearly, statutes allowing employers to solicit an employee's consent to a
polygraph invited potential abuse.3 9 Many disputed the assumption that
consent was truly voluntary, arguing that any consent given was really co-
erced. 4° Rather, employers' requests subjected potential or current employ-
ees to economic coercion" and confronted them with "the Hobson's choice
of [either] taking the test or not even being considered for the job."'42 The
employees also faced the similarly distasteful choice between livelihood or
self-incrimination.43 Employees' refusals to submit to polygraph tests led
employers to draw the conclusion that the employees had something to
hide.4" Such a conclusion ignored any bona fide rights that potential or cur-
36. Castagnera-Cain, supra note 22, at 203.
37. Those states that allowed an employer to request that an employee submit to an exam
were: California, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, Montana, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont,
and Washington. Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Wyoming had no
statutes regulating polygraph use in private industry. Note, The Polygraph Protection Act of
1985; Bobbing Pinocchio's New Nose?, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1411, 1427 (1986).
38. Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wiscon-
sin. Id.
39. See 134 CONG. REC. S1717 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Sen. Hatch); S. REP.
No. 284, supra note 6, at 43-44, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 730-
32.
40. Comment, supra note 1, at 560 (citing Taliek, The Lie Detector and the Right to Pri-
vacy, 40 N.Y. ST. B.J. 102, 109 (1968); Markson, A Reexamination of the Role of Lie Detectors
in Labor Relations, 22 LAB. L.J. 394, 405 (1971)).
41. Hermann, supra note 5, at 77; see also Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 82-83 (1973)
(a waiver obtained through the threat of economic coercion was not voluntary); Gardner,
supra note 5, at 318.
42. Comment, supra note 1, at 560. Indeed, in the Senate debates, 134 CONG. REC. S1800
(daily ed. Mar. 3, 1988) (statement of Sen. Kerry), Senator Kerry questioned the possibility of
voluntariness due to the overwhelming bargaining power of the employer over the employee
and its built in coercion factor. See also 134 CONG. REc. S1715 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1988)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy questioning the voluntariness of any consent due to the fallibility
of the instrument).
43. Hermann, supra note 5, at 139 (citing Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497
(1966)).
44. Gardner, supra note 5, at 299 & n.22.
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rent employees possessed.45 Thus, it appeared that consent was often co-
erced. Therefore, statutes saying "request" in effect meant "require."
As an alternative to prohibiting or restricting polygraph exams, some stat-
utes established licensing requirements for polygraph examiners and re-
stricted areas of inquiry open to polygraph examination.46 Although these
requirements varied from state to state,47 the primary goal of such legislation
was to eliminate examiner incompetence. 4 For example, some states re-
quired attendance at approved schools of polygraphy; others merely man-
dated competency examinations.49 In imposing such requirements,
legislatures intended to increase reliability "by limiting the right to adminis-
ter polygraph tests to ... capable, trained, and honest" individuals.5"
State legislation arguably proved ineffective.51 Regulatory approaches
lacked broad application and strong enforcement mechanisms.52 Abuse of
polygraphs continued to grow despite state legislation.53 In fact, some em-
ployers set up practices of crossing state lines to hire employees from states
45. Hermann, supra note 5, at 139. Perhaps in light of the potential for abuse, states
enacted prohibitory statutes. Note, supra note 25, at 102. But see Comment, supra note 1, at
567 (stating that a complete ban on polygraphs not only dissuaded polygraph research, but
equally eliminated the efficiency of the hiring process).
46. Note, supra note 37, at 1422. These states were: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Cali-
fornia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Ne-
vada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Vermont. See Hurd, supra note 2, at 542
nn.75-76.
47. Gardner, supra note 5, at 312.
48. Note, The Polygraphic Technique. A Selective Analysis, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 330, 348
(1971).
49. Gardner, supra note 5, at 312.
50. Hermann, supra note 5, at 100. But see Tiner & O'Grady, Lie Detectors in Employ-
ment, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 85, 111 (1988) (arguing that licensing laws skirt the real
problem of reliability and tend to "legitimize the machines, their operators and the entire
'scientific process' of lie detecting").
51. Note, supra note 25, at 105.
52. Note, supra note 4, at 806.
53. Tiner & O'Grady, supra note 50, at 111.
1989]
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with less restrictive regulations.54 Thus, the ineffectiveness of state legisla-
tion strengthened the demand for uniform federal legislation."
C. Failed Attempts at Federal Legislation
To halt the unbridled use of the polygraph in the workplace, members of
Congress introduced over forty bills directed at regulating the "lie detector"
in the last twenty years.56 Concentrating on privacy concerns and protect-
ing individuals against constitutional infringements, these proposals primar-
ily applied to the federal and private workforces." However, while federal
legislation would have provided the necessary uniformity and protection
against constitutional infringements, these bills met with unfaltering
failure.5"
54. Id. at 110; Letter from American Civil Liberties Union to Rep. Pat Williams (Oct. 30,
1987) (supporting prohibition of the use of polygraphs in private employment), reprinted in
133 CONG. REC. E4349 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987); 134 CONG. REC. S1725 (daily ed. Mar. 2,
1988) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). The scope and diversity of legislation among the states
supports a conclusion that the protection of individual rights may have been contingent upon
the state in which that individual resided, But see W. VA. CODE § 21-5-5b (1985) (explicitly
prohibiting employers from knowingly using the results of polygraph examinations adminis-
tered outside state lines in personnel decision making).
55. Letter from Leonard Saxe, Ph.D., to Rep. Pat Williams (Oct. 2, 1987) ("The patch-
work of ineffective state legislation seems to have created a chaotic situation that only national
legislation can correct."), reprinted in 133 CoNG. REC. E4350 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987).
56. Note, supra note 4, at 806 n.6 (citing Polygraphs in the Workplace: The Use of "Lie
Detectors" in Hiring and Firing: Hearings on H.R. 1524 and H.R. 1924 Before the Subcomm.
on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
51 (1985) (statement of Robert Harbrant, President, Food and Allied Serv. Trades Dep't.,
AFL-CIO)). Perhaps the first attempt of Congress to address the issue of lie detectors came
when the House Government Operations Committee conducted an investigation revealing
widespread use among the government. Note, supra note 15, at 700 (citing Hearings on the
Use of Polygraphs as 'Lie Detectors' by the Federal Government Before the Subcomm. on For-
eign Operations and Gov't Information of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1964)).
57. Tiner & O'Grady, supra note 50, at 106. Exemplary of such legislation is S. 1035,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) proposing, "[a]n Act to protect civilian employees of the executive
branch of the United States Government in the enjoyment of their constitutional rights and to
prevent unwarranted governmental invasions of privacy." Hermann, supra note 5, at 150.
58. Note, supra note 4, at 816 n.84. One critic attributes the unrelenting failure of prior
bills to their prohibiting scope: "[I]t is time to pass a bill which will balance the interests of the
employee with the property rights of the employer ... [and thus] facilitate prevention of the
current abuses of polygraph testing and allow assembly of data that will establish the proper
parameters of polygraph use." Comment, supra note 1, at 569.
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II. FEDERAL LEGISLATION STRIKES A BLOW TO ACHIEVE FAIRNESS:
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE FLIP OF THE COIN
Despite many failed attempts to enact federal legislation on polygraphs,
on June 21, 1988, President Reagan signed into law59 the Polygraph Act."
Aimed at striking a balance between the constitutional rights of employees6
and the property rights of employers,62 the Act seeks a middle ground be-
tween the unbridled use of polygraph examination and total prohibition.
63
Seeking to "prevent the denial of employment opportunities, ' 64 the Act pro-
hibits private employers from using polygraphs during private employment
application procedures or as a means of randomly evaluating current em-
ployees,65 and establishes national minimum standards for polygraphing
under the exemptions.66 The Act also attempts to "focus use of the poly-
graph where it is likely to be the most accurate."
67
59. L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT SCREENING § 12.03, at 12-74 (1988). Representative Pat
Williams (D. Mont.) sponsored H.R. 1524 which passed the House of Representatives on
March 12, 1986 by a vote of 236-173. Senators Orrin Hatch (D. Utah) and Edward Kennedy
(D. Mass.) co-sponsored the Senate companion bill, S. 1815. The bill went through the Con-
ference Committee and passed by an overwhelming majority.
60. The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-347, 102 Stat. 646
(1988) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009).
61. Employees assert general rights of privacy. See, e.g., Note, supra note 3, at 950-51.
62. Employers assert property interests in their businesses and their property. Id.
63. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
64. 133 CONG. REC. H9528 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 659, supra
note 10, at 11, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 749.
65. S. REP. No. 284, supra note 6, at 39, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 726.
66. 134 CONG. REC. S1799 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1988) (statement of Rep. Durenberger);
Note, supra note 37, at 1412 (citing S. 1815, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.; 131 CONG. REC. S14,533
(1985) (statement ofSen. Hatch that the purpose of the Act is to provide uniform protection
from polygraph test abuse)).
67. 134 CONG. REC. S1796 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1988) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see 29
U.S.C.A. § 2006(a)-(f) (West. Supp. 1989) (delineating the exemptions from the Employee
Polygraph Protection Act); 133 CONG. REC. H9534 (statement of Rep. Young: " [Ilf it be-
comes law just like it is written today, there will be the use of polygraphs throughout
America"). However, the limited uses are applicable only to polygraph tests as distinguished
from other lie detector tests. See infra notes 70-71.
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A. Breadth of Coverage and Prohibition
The Polygraph Act applies to private employers68 engaged in interstate
commerce.69 Broadly defining the terms "lie detector
' 70 and "polygraph," 7 I
the Act prohibits employers from resorting to these devices for either preem-
ployment screening purposes or random testing.7 2 Specifically, the provi-
sions make it unlawful to require, request, cause, or even suggest that
employees, current or prospective, submit to a polygraph as a condition of
employment.73 In addition, the Act further restricts use of the device, or
results obtained therefrom. 74 First, it prohibits any use, acceptance, or in-
quiry by employers regarding information obtained through polygraph
use. 7 5 Second, the Act eliminates any adverse employment action against
employees for refusing to take the test, filing a complaint, exercising rights
68. For purposes of the Act, "employer" is defined as:
any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee or prospective employee. A polygraph examiner either employed for or
whose services are retained for the sole purpose of administering polygraph tests
ordinarily would not be deemed an 'employer' with respect to examinees.
Application of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 53 Fed. Reg. 41,497 (1988) (to
be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 801.2). Section 2006(a) specifically exempts public employers from
the Act's coverage. See infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
69. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2002 (West Supp. 1989). Subsection 2001(1) defines commerce as pro-
vided in the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(b) (1978): "'Commerce' means trade,
commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or be-
tween any State and any place outside thereof."
70. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2001(3). According to the Act, "lie detector" means: "a polygraph,
deceptograph, voice stress analyzer, psychological stress evaluator, or any other similar device
(whether mechanical or electrical) that is used, or the results of which are used, for the pur-
pose of rendering a diagnostic opinion regarding the honesty or dishonesty of an individual."
Id.
71. Id. § 2001(4). "'Polygraph' means an instrument that - (A) records continuously,
visually, permanently, and simultaneously changes in cardiovascular, respiratory, and elec-
trodermal patterns as minimum instrumentation standards; and (B) is used, or the results of
which are used, for the purpose of rendering a diagnostic opinion regarding the honesty or
dishonesty of an individual." Id. By excluding the term 'chemical testing' from its definition
of polygraph and lie detector, see id., Congress preserved the right of employers to use tests to
ascertain the presence of controlled substances in an employee's body. Congress further distin-
guished between the two terms, polygraph and lie detector, to clarify its intentions that only a
polygraph may be used under the exemptions. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,497 (1989) (to be codified at 20
C.F.R. § 801.1).
72. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2002; 53 Fed. Reg. 41,497 (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 801.1); see also
Craver, supra note 17, at 43 & n. 197. Prof. Craver argues that because preemployment testing
is not "job related" and polygraphs are coercive, legislators should generally prohibit preem-
ployment use of polygraphs and allow polygraphs only in the context of security purposes. Id.
73. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2002(1).
74. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
75. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2002(2).
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provided by the Act, giving testimony in connection with the Act's enforce-
ment, or on the basis of the results of any test.
7 6
B. Preservation of Existing Laws or Agreements
While grasping for the goal of uniformity, the Polygraph Act does not by
its own terms achieve uniformity. The Act applies to laws less restrictive by
their terms than the Act itself on polygraph use, whether state or local law
or collective bargaining agreements." Accordingly, the Act does not pre-
empt an existing agreement or law which subjects polygraph testing to total
prohibition or stricter control.7" A legislature, state or local, remains free to
enact more stringent provisions to maintain control over polygraphs.7 9
However, the regulations clarify this provision by requiring state provisions
to be stricter in all aspects of usage.8 ° Thus, state polygraph laws must pro-
pose stricter procedural safeguards, test result limitations, rights and reme-
dies of examinees, as well as employer and examiner responsibilities.8"
Because of its limited impact on state law, the Act preserves the dominant
role of existing law. But, the Act also presents the possibility of state legisla-
tion which extinguishes any or all exemptions provided in the Polygraph
Act.8 2 Thus, the regulations interpreting the Act contemplate three possible
schemes of regulation. The first possible scheme constitutes exclusive federal
regulation. If the Polygraph Act represents the most restrictive regulation,
it preempts state law. Second, for states imposing more stringent regulation,
those rules supplant federal law. Finally, where some federal requirements
impose stricter regulation and some state strictures are more prohibitive,
federal law and state law may intermingle. 3
Thus, while the Polygraph Act seeks to establish a system of uniform
polygraph use among employers, the Act preserves the possibility of state
regulation.8 4 Where provisions of state legislation impose more restrictive
regulations on polygraph testing, state law may take precedence over the
76. Id. § 2002(3)-(4); see also 53 Fed. Reg. 41,497-98 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 801.4(c)).
77. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 2009 (West Supp. 1989).
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,497-98 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.5).
81. Id.
82. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 659, supra note 10, at 15, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 754. In the Conference Report, for example, the conferees recognized the
possibility of union agreements providing more extensive protection for employees. Addition-
ally, they foresaw the possibility of states enacting across the board prohibitions applicable to
private and public employees.
83. See 53 Fed. Reg. 41,497-98 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.5).
84. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
1989]
Catholic University Law Review
Act. 5 Yet, regardless of whether the Act preempts a particular state's law,
the Act imposes a duty upon employers to provide notice to employees ex-
plaining its provisions.8 6
C. The Requirement of Notice
To effectuate compliance and protect employees' constitutional rights, the
Act requires employers to prominently post notices clearly explaining the
provisions of the Act.8 7  The language specifically requires that
"[e]mployer[s] shall post and maintain such notice[s] in conspicuous places
on [their] premises where notices to employees and applicants to employ-
ment are customarily posted.",
8 1
D. The Exemptions
While absolutely prohibiting the use of the polygraph as a preemployment
screening device,89 the Polygraph Act permits the following employers to
use the polygraph in other circumstances: public sector employers,90 na-
tional defense and security employers,9 employers conducting investigations
of economic loss or injury,92 employers authorized to manufacture, dis-
tribute or dispense controlled substances, 93 and employers providing secur-
ity services.94 Thus, although it does not completely ban polygraph usage,
the Polygraph Act circumscribes polygraph testing and delineates proce-
dural safeguards to protect employees and employers.95
85. See 53 Fed. Reg. 41,497-98 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.5).
86. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2003.
87. Id.
88. Id. While the language of the provisions appears to contemplate Secretary of Labor
notification to every employer, the legislative history recognizes the absurdity of such a re-
quirement. The regulations confirm the impossibility of the task and provide that copies of
notices may be obtained at local offices of the Wage and Hour Division, the organizational unit
at the Department of Labor responsible for enforcement and administration of the Act. 53
Fed. Reg. 41,497-98 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.6).
89. L. LARSON, supra note 59, § 12.03 at 12-74.
90. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(a) (West Supp. 1989).
91. Id. § 2006(b)-(c). FBI contractors are included under subsection (c).
92. Id. § 2006(d).
93. Id. § 2006(f).
94. Id. § 2006(e).
95. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 659, supra note 10, at 12-13, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 750-52. The restrictions on the use of exemptions, 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 2007, are discussed infra notes 149-215 and accompanying text.
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1. The Public Sector Employers' Exemption
The Polygraph Act exempts "public sector employers"96 from its cover-
age.97 This provision exempts not only the Federal Government,9 8 but also
State or local governments. 99 However, the regulations limit the scope of
the exclusion by not encompassing government contractors or nongovern-
mental agents working under the supervision of the government. " °
While the Act denies protection to public employees, it confers jurisdic-
tion over polygraphing of the public sector to congressional committees pos-
sessing the appropriate jurisdiction and expertise.101 Therefore, public
employees may already possess protection against polygraph testing under
existing legislation. 02 The Act permits polygraph use in the public sector as
an "insurance measure" for the public interest."
96. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
97. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(a) (West Supp. 1989) provides: "This chapter shall not apply
with respect to the United States Government, any State or local government, or any political
subdivision of a State or local government."
98. United States Government "means any agency or instrumentality, civilian or military,
of the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the Federal Government, and includes
independent agencies, wholly-owned government corporations, and nonappropriated fund in-
strumentalities." 53 Fed. Reg. 41,499 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.10(b)).
99. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(a); 53 Fed. Reg. 41,499 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.10(a)).
100. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,499 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.10(c)).
101. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 659, supra note 10, at 12, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 750.
102. In order to study government usage of polygraphs, an interagency committee was set
up in 1965. H.R. REP. No. 198, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). The committee recommendation
that federal employees not be given polygraphs led to the Civil Service regulations. L. LAR-
SON, supra note 59, § 12.03 at 12-77 to -78 & n.25. These regulations establish restrictions on
polygraph use in "personnel investigations of competitive service applicants and appointees to
competitive service positions." Id. at 12-78. Moreover, the United States Constitution places
restraints on polygraph use by government employers. Id. at 12-80.
103. This "insurance measure" may be due to wide support for the proposition that the
special positions of trust that government employees occupy, Note, Long Beach City Employ-
ees Association v. City of Long Beach: Truth or Consequences, 18 PAC. L.J. 407, 420 (1987),
demand assurances of honesty and impartiality. Id. at 427. In Civil Serv. Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 139 Cal. App. 3d 449, 188 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1983), the Court of Appeals supported
this proposition in stating:
'In the course of his work, a public officer or employee must yield some of the privi-
leges which are enjoyed by the citizenry at large.' Unlike a private employee, a public
employee is 'directly, immediately, and elitirely responsible to the city or State which
is his [or her] employer .... He [or she] is a trustee of the public interest, bearing the
burden of great and total responsibility to his [or her] public employer.' While a
public employee cannot be forced to give an answer which may tend to incriminate
him or her in criminal proceedings, he may be required to choose between disclosing
information and losing his employment.
139 Cal. App. 3d at 455, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 810 (citations omitted).
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2. The National Defense and Security Exemption
The Act endorses polygraph testing as a vital instrument for national de-
fense and security purposes.'O°  Limited to the Federal Government,10 5 the
exemption permits the administration of the polygraph in pursuit of intelli-
gence or counterintelligence functions."0 6 The exemption not only allows
defense or intelligence agencies to subject their employees to polygraph ex-
aminations, but permits examination of agency contractors and their em-
ployees, and any individual working in areas with sensitive or classified
information. 1o7
Although application of the national defense and security exemption ap-
pears to reach a wide range of employers, the scope of the exemption is
limited. First, the provisions of the Act delineate certain agencies whose
activities are sufficiently vital to national defense and security to necessitate
use of the device.'0 8 Second, certain Department of Defense directives and
regulations constrain the administration of polygraphs under this
exemption.' 09
3. The Private Employers' Limited Exemption for Ongoing
Investigations
Recognizing the validity of a polygraph used in connection with investiga-
tions of specific incidents, rather than as a predictor of future perform-
ance, 10 the Polygraph Act provides private employers a limited exemption
104. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 659, supra note 10, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 750-51.
105. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(b) (West Supp. 1989).
106. L. LARSON, supra note 59, § 12.03 at 12-76. The interim regulations define "counter-
intelligence" as: "information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage
and other clandestine intelligence activities, sabotage, terrorist activities, or assassinations con-
ducted for or on behalf of foreign governments, or foreign or domestic organizations or per-
sons." 53 Fed. Reg. 41,499 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.11(f)).
107. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(b)-(c).
108. The national defense exemption is limited to the Department of Defense (DOD) or
Department of Energy (DOE) in activities connected with atomic energy defenses. Id.
§ 2006(b)(I)(A)-(B). The security exemption is limited to the National Security Agency, the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency. Id. § 2006(b)(2)(A)(i).
However, section 2006(b)(2)(B) applies an exemption to any agency where an individual has
access to classified or sensitive information. Section 2006(c) extends the exemption to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
109. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,499 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.1 l(g)). The regulations provide
that the administration be in accordance with DOD regulations. Id. However, the scope was
specifically limited to counterintelligence screening. See id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 801.11 (c)).
110. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 659, supra note 10, at 12-13, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 751; 134 CONG. REC. H3727 (daily ed. June 1, 1988) (statement of
Rep. Jeffords quoting the Office of Technology Assessment).
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for "ongoing investigations.""' The Department of Labor's regulations in-
terpret an "ongoing investigation" as one examining a specific incident or
activity.112 Furthermore, employers may not use the exemption as a pretext
to ascertain the occurrence of an economic loss." 3 Rather, before resorting
to the polygraph, employers must first pinpoint losses or injuries." 4 Thus,
where investigations focus on specific economic losses or injuries" 5 to em-
ployers' businesses, employers may legally request, but not require, employ-
ees to take a polygraph test."
16
Before requesting a polygraph exam in connection with an "ongoing in-
vestigation," employers must establish two prerequisites. First, they must
establish that the employees possessed access to the stolen property.
117
Under the regulations, "access" may constitute a bare opportunity to cause,
or aid someone in causing, the injury," 8 thus "includ[ing] more than direct
or physical contact during the course of employment.""' Second, employ-
ers must establish that evidence exists supporting "a reasonable suspicion
that the employee[s] [were] involved in the incident[s] or activit[ies] under
investigation."' 2 ° The Conference Report defines reasonable suspicion as re-
quiring an objective, articulable, factual basis for suspicion beyond merely a
loss and possible access.' 21
In addition to showing access to property and reasonable suspicion, em-
ployers must provide clear, written statements of the incidents being investi-
111. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(d) (West Supp. 1989).
112. "[R]andom testing by an employer is specifically precluded by the Act. Further, by
limiting the exemption to a specific incident or activity, an employer is precluded from using
the exemption in situations where the so-called 'ongoing investigation' is continuous." 53 Fed.
Reg. 41,499 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.12(b)).
113. Id.
114. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(d)(1).
115. To be considered an economic loss, it must be a result of an intentional wrongdoing,
not a mere loss. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,500 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.12(c)(2)). Economic
loss sufficient under the exemption may include: theft, embezzlement, misappropriation, in-
dustrial espionage, or sabotage. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(d)(1).
116. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(d)(1).
117. Id. § 2006(d)(2).
118. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,500 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.12(c)(1)).
119. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.12(e)(1)).
120. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(d)(3).
121. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 659, supra note 10, at 13, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 751. The Conference R,eport stated that "reasonable"
could include such factors as the demeanor of the employee or discrepancies which
arise during the course of an investigation. And while access alone does not consti-
tute a basis for reasonable suspicion, the totality of circumstances surrounding such
access, such as its unauthorized or unusual nature, may constitute an additional
factor.
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gated, describing with "particularity" their reasons for suspecting the
employees and the access the employees possessed. 122 The regulations clar-
ify that the particularity requirement encompasses more than a general ex-
planation of the loss and suspicion. 123 The provision requires employers to
reduce their suspicions to specific, clear cut writings. 124 Furthermore, a per-
son with binding authority over the employers must sign the statement 125
and the employers must preserve it as a part of their records for three
years. 126
4. The Exemption for Drug Security, Drug Theft, or Drug Diversion
Investigations
The Polygraph Act further allows polygraph exams to monitor employees
engaged in the manufacture, distribution, or dispensation of controlled sub-
stances. 127 The Act specifies that the exemption applies only to employers
working with certain substances.1 2 ' Furthermore, employers' use of the
polygraph may turn on employees' "access" to substances and vary with the
types of employees.' 29
As interpreted by the regulations, the controlled substance exemption re-
quires authorization by and registration with the Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration (DEA) as a prerequisite to employers' coverage. 130  While
employers may manufacture controlled substances in the ordinary course of
business, the absence of DEA registration renders the exemption unavaila-
ble.'31  Assuming coverage of employers under the exemption, prior to ad-
ministration of a polygraph test to prospective employees, 132 employers
122. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(d)(4)(A).
123. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,500 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.12(g)(3)).
124. Id.
125. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(d)(4)(B).
126. Id. § 2006(d)(4)(C). "Administering a polygraph test ... without identification of a
specific incident or activity and 'a reasonable suspicion that the employee was involved' would
amount to little more than a fishing expedition." 53 Fed. Reg. 41,499 (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. § 801.12(b)).
127. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(f)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
128. Id. This section makes it clear that the employer must be dealing with a controlled
substance, schedule I, II, III or IV, as defined under the Controlled Substance Act, 21 U.S.C.
§ 812 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
129. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(f)(2)(A)-(B).
130. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.13(b)(2)).
131. Id.
132. The regulations expand the definition of a prospective employee to current employees,
although presently working in a position void of direct access, who are under consideration for
positions with the company entailing direct access. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 801.13(d)).
[Vol. 39:235
Employee Polygraph Protection Act
must show that the employees would have direct access 1 33 to the controlled
substance. 134 In contrast, when testing current employees, employers need
only show that employees had "access" to the substance. 1 35 Even when test-
ing current employees, however, the regulations provide that the exam may
only be given in connection with an ongoing investigation.136 Accordingly,
the exam becomes subject to the rigorous standards established for the ongo-
ing investigation exemption.'
37
5. The Security Services Exemption
The Polygraph Act provides an additional exemption from the ban on
polygraph tests to private employers providing personnel for armored cars;
designing, installing, or maintaining security alarms; or providing "plain
clothes" security personnel.' 38 To come within the exemption, employers
must establish that the provision of such security services constitutes their
"primary business purpose."' 139 Furthermore, the regulations clarify that
employers may only administer the polygraph to employees specifically em-
ployed to provide protection to "facilities, materials, or operations" having a
significant impact on the health or safety of the public."
40
Although applicable only to prospective employees, or current employees
transferring within the company to new positions meeting the requirements
under the exemption, the regulations broaden the coverage of the exemption
to encompass individuals whose duties impact seclrity of a covered "facility,
material, or operation," directly or indirectly.' The scope of the exemp-
tion extends not only to positions providing prospective employees an oppor-
tunity to engage in a breach of security, but equally extends to those
positions where prospective employees may cause other employees to engage
133. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.13(c)(1)).
134. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(f)(2)(A).
135. Id. § 2006(f)(2)(B)(ii). The access controlling here is that as defined with regard to
ongoing investigations. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
136. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,502 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.13(f)).
137. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(f)(2)(B)(i). This exemption does not apply unless the investiga-
tion involves loss or injury to the employer in the manufacture, distribution, or dispensation of
a controlled substance. "An economic loss or injury related to such noncontrolled substances
would not constitute a basis of applicability of the [subsection 2006(f)] exemption." 53 Fed.
Reg. 41,502 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.13(f)(2)(i)).
138. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(e)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
139. Id. In other words, "at least 50% of the employer's annual dollar volume of business"
must be derived from such services. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,502 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 801.14(c)).
140. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,502 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.14(d)(1)); 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 2006(e)(2).
141. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,502 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.14(d)); 29 U.S.C.A. § 2 0 0 6(e).
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in such a breach. 142 Mere knowledge vital to a security interest obtained
from a position may present the possibility of a security violation and thus
bring an employee within the exemption.
14 3
In providing protection to "facilities, materials, or operations," the Act
covers a broad range of activities arguably unrelated to security services.
For example, guards employed at public transportation, power plants, public
water supply facilities, and toxic waste storages or disposals may be covered
under the exemption.' While not exhaustive, the Department of Labor
regulations clarify that the exemption extends protection only to activities
having a "significant" impact on public safety or health.' 4 5 The exemption
also extends coverage to firms protecting "currency, negotiable securities,
precious commodities or instruments, or proprietary information."'
14 6
Under the regulations, coverage of a particular facility, material, or opera-
tion under the security exemption ultimately rests within the discretion of
the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division "based on all the facts
and circumstances." 147 However, even assuming coverage under the exemp-
tion, an employer's use of the polygraph under the security services exemp-
tion, like the other exemptions, is restricted by procedural safeguards.' 48
E. Restrictions on Polygraph Usage Under the Exemptions
In addition to restricting the circumstances of polygraph usage, 149 the Act
delineates certain procedural safeguards 5 ' to protect both employees and
employers. 15
1. Adverse Employment Actions
Under the Polygraph Act, employers may lawfully examine employees
under the exemptions established for ongoing investigations, controlled sub-
stances, and security services. 1 52 However, the Act limits the manner in
which employers may use the results, or lack thereof, obtained from admin-
istration of a polygraph. 1' Employers, acting under an exemption, may not
142. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,502 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.14(g)(5)).
143. Id.
144. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(e)(l)(A).
145. Id.; 53 Fed. Reg. 41,502 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.14(a)(1)).
146. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(e)(1)(B).
147. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,503 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.14(d)(3)).
148. See infra notes 149-215 and accompanying text.
149. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006 (West Supp. 1989).
150. Id. § 2007.
151. Id.
152. Id. § 2006(d)-(f).
153. Id. § 2007.
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advance any adverse employment action against employees, current or pro-
spective, based solely on the outcome of the examination or employees' re-
fusals to submit thereto." 4 These limits attempt to enforce congressional
intent that the test not be used where employers take any action against
employees, whether the action takes the form of a discharge, discipline, de-
nial of employment or promotion, or discrimination, based solely on the
analysis of a polygraph.
155
Although the results of a polygraph may not serve as the sole basis for an
adverse employment action,' 56 the regulations provide that employers may
use the results as a contributing factor in deciding to take adverse action.'
57
For example, employers may use the results of a polygraph administered
under an ongoing investigation as evidence of misconduct, but may only take
adverse action if additional supporting evidence exists.'5 8 Similarly, the out-
come of tests given employees in connection with the security services or
controlled substances exemptions may serve as supplementary evidence sup-
porting adverse action. 59 Thus, employers must first satisfy the underlying
requirements of the applicable exemptions in order to take adverse action.' 60
2. Rights of Examinees
Section 2007(b) of the Act further restricts the limited usage of the poly-
graph by enacting rights for tested employees. ' 6' Under this section, the Act
delineates requirements that must be followed during all phases of the
exam.' 62 The Act further specifies procedures during each of the exam's
stages:' 63 the pre-test phase, 164 the actual testing phase, 65 and the post-test
phase.' 66 Failure to meet the requirements set forth under this section ren-
ders the respective exemptions inapplicable.'
67
154. Id. § 2007(a)(1)-(2).
155. Id. § 2007(a)(2); 53 Fed. Reg. 41,504 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.20(a)).
156. Id. § 2007(a)(2); 53 Fed. Reg. 41,504 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.20(a)).
157. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,504 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.20(b)).
158. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(a)(1). Additional supporting evidence may amount to the em-
ployee's access, statements made by the employee, or evidence that initially gave the employer
a reasonable suspicion. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,504 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.20(b)); H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 659, supra note 10, at 14, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 753.
159. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,504 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.21).
160. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.21(c)).
161. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(b) (West Supp. 1989).
162. Id. § 2007(b)(1).
163. Id. § 2007(b)(2)-(4).
164. Id. § 2007(b)(2).
165. Id. § 2007(b)(3).
166. Id. § 2007(b)(4).
167. Id. § 2007(b); see infra notes 235-45 and accompanying text.
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Throughout all phases of the exam, examinees possess certain uncondi-
tional rights.16 The Act prohibits probing questions which are "unnecessa-
rily intrusive" or "degrading."' 6 9 More specifically, a polygraph may not
inquire into irrelevant matters such as religion,' 7 ° racial concerns, 17 1 poli-
tics,172 sexual preferences,1 73 or union sentiments.174 Furthermore, where
the possibility exists that medical or psychological conditions of examinees
may impair the accuracy of tests, upon provision of sufficient written evi-
dence by employees,' 7 5 the Act prohibits testing them. 176 Moreover, the
Act preserves employees' rights to privacy by permitting them to terminate
the exam at any time, without suffering threats of disciplinary action other
than that allowed under the exemptions. 7 7 Medical reasons, as well as
other reasons, may form the basis for this termination.
17
The provisions providing for examinees' rights demarcate three separate
test stages for exam administration.179 The pre-test phase involves preparing
polygraph candidates for the actual test phase. 80 The actual test involves
both administration and analysis of the exam.' The post-test phase consti-
tutes follow-up questioning and review of test results.'8 2
(a) The Pre-test Phase
During the pre-test phase of the examination, the Polygraph Act provides
examinees with an opportunity to review the proposed questions.' 83 It also
requires that examinees be notified of their rights during all stages of the
test,184 and given an explanation of the operation of the device. ' 8 5 Employ-
168. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(b)(1).
169. L. LARSON, supra note 59, § 6.05 at 6-38; 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(b)(1)(B).
170. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(b)(l)(C)(i).
171. Id. § 2007(b)(I)(C)(ii).
172. Id. § 2007(b)(1)(C)(iii).
173. Id. § 2007(b)(1)(C)(iv).
174. Id. § 2007(b)(1)(C)(v).
175. To constitute sufficient written evidence under the regulations, the employee must
provide "at a minimum, a statement by a physician specifically describing the examinee's med-
ical or psychological condition or treatment and the basis for the physician's opinion that the
condition or treatment might result in such abnormal responses." 53 Fed. Reg. 41,504 (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.22(b)(l)(iv)).
176. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(b)(1)(D).
177. Id. § 2007(b)(1)(A).
178. Id.
179. Id. § 2007(b)(2)-(4).
180. See 53 Fed. Reg. 41,505 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.22(c)(1)).
181. See id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.22(c)(2)).
182. See id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.22(c)(3)).
183. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(b)(2)(E) (West Supp. 1989).
184. Id. § 2007(b)(2)(C)-(D).
185. Id. § 2007(b)(2)(B).
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ers must provide written notice to examinees' 8 6 describing unambiguously
the place and time of the exam"8 7 and advising them of their right to consult
an attorney or other representative.'8 8  The regulations require additional
written notice verified by the examinees' signatures. 8 9 This additional writ-
ten notice must advise examinees of any hidden means by which they may be
observed,' 90 any intent of examiners to use additional devices in conjunction
with the polygraph,' 9 ' and "that the employer[s] or the examinee[s] may,
with mutual knowledge, make a recording of the test."' 92 The notice must
also inform examinees that any statement made by them may subsequently
be used as evidence' 93 and that taking the test may not be a condition of
employment. 194 Further, the notice must explain the disclosure require-
ments' "9 5 and the legal rights and remedies under the Act of both the em-
ployers and examinees.' 96 Lastly, the regulations require employers to
provide examinees notification that "the [employees'] rights under the Act
may not be waived, either voluntarily or involuntarily, by contract or other-
wise, except as part of a written settlement to a pending action or complaint
under the Act, agreed to and signed by the parties."' 97
(b) The Actual Test Phase
During the actual test phase, the administration and analysis of the exam
occurs.' 98 The Act eliminates questioning outside the scope of matters that
the examinees previously reviewed during the pre-test phase. 
99
(c) The Post-test Phase
The last phase of the examination encompasses any contact between ex-
aminees and examiners subsequent to the test itself.2° ° Prior to any adverse
186. Id. § 2007(b)(2)(A). In order to give the examinee time to consult an attorney, notice
must be given 48 hours prior to the exam. See 53 Fed. Reg. 41,505 (1988) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. § 801.22(c)(1)(i)(A)).
187. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(b)(2)(A).
188. Id.
189. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,505 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.22(c)(1)(i)(C)).
190. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(b)(2)(C)(i).
191. Id. § 2007(b)(2)(C)(ii).
192. Id. § 2007(b)(2)(C)(iii).
193. Id. § 2007(b)(2)(D)(ii).
194. Id. § 2007(b)(2)(D)(i).
195. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,505 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.22(c)(1)(i)(C)(4)).
196. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(b)(2)(D)(iv)-(v).
197. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,505 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.22(c)(1)(i)(C)(6)).
198. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.22(c)(2)).
199. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(b)(3) (West Supp. 1989).
200. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,505 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.22(c)(3)).
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action by employers as a result of the outcome of the test, examiners must
interview examinees regarding the results of the test. 20 ' Examiners must
also provide examinees with a copy of the questions asked, "the correspond-
ing charted responses," and their analysis of the polygraph results.20 2
3. Qualifications and Requirements of Examiners
The Polygraph Act not only sets forth requirements for preserving exam-
inees' rights, 2 3 but also specifies minimal qualifications and requirements
for examiners, 2° 4 and conditions applicability of the exemptions to compli-
ance. 215 Extending deference to the licensing and regulatory authorities at
the state level, the Act requires that polygraphers possess a license only if the
state in which exam administration occurs so requires.20 6 Regardless of
where the exam occurs, all examiners must carry a minimum liability cover-
age of $50,000. 2 7 Further, the Act supplements state requirements by es-
tablishing control over the exam itself, enforcing examinees' rights, 20 8 and
setting limitations on the number,20 9 duration,21 0 and analysis of the
exams. 
2 11
The Act strictly limits examiners to the scope of the polygraph exam in
analyzing the results.212 Furthermore, employers must preserve all reports
or records pertaining to the exam for three years.21 3 Finally, examiners
must present in writing214 any conclusion drawn regarding the truthfulness
of examinees and refrain from any personal recommendation.
2 ,I
F. Recordkeeping and Disclosure Requirements
Whereas the Polygraph Act allows the use of the polygraph under certain
limited, 2 6 restricted 21 7 circumstances, the Act places additional restrictions
201. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(b)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1989).
202. Id. § 2007(b)(4)(B).
203. Id. § 2007(b).
204. Id. § 2007(c).
205. Id.
206. Id. § 2007(c)(1)(A).
207. Id. § 2007(c)(1)(B).
208. Id. § 2007(b).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. § 2007(c)(2).
212. Id. § 2007(c)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).
213. Id. § 2007(c)(2)(B).
214. Id. § 2007(c)(2)(A)(i).
215. Id. § 2007(c)(2)(A)(iii).
216. Id. § 2006; see supra notes 89-148 and accompanying text.
217. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007 (West Supp. 1989); see supra notes 149-215 and accompanying
text.
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on the use of the information obtained from the exam itself.2 1 The Act
limits disclosure of the exam results,21 9 and the regulations implementing
the disclosure provisions impose recordkeeping requirements for documents
obtained or growing out of the administration of the exam.22 °
Generally, the regulations place a heavy burden on employers to maintain
records.2 2 1 Whenever an employer requests administration of an exam, the
employer must make this request in writing and maintain a copy for three
years.22 2 Moreover, where an employer demands a polygraph exam under
the exemption for ongoing investigations, it must preserve not only a copy of
the statement describing the incident, the "reasonable suspicion" and the
employee's access to the property, 223 but also it must maintain separate
records outlining the loss itself.224 After the exam, the employer is required
to maintain a copy of the examiner's report in a safe location with other
employment files accessible to the Secretary of Labor or an authorized repre-
sentative within seventy-two hours notice.22 5
In addition to employers, examiners must keep records and reports.
226
They must maintain both records of the number of exams given daily, and
the reports made from each exam.227 Furthermore, the regulations also re-
quire that examiners keep these documents in a safe and quickly accessible
location.228
To further constrain the use of the polygraph, the Act establishes limita-
tions on the disclosure of records and documents obtained from examina-
tions.2 2 ' The provisions restrict both examiners and employers from
disclosing information without authorization from examinees.230 Disclosure
is permitted only to someone authorized to receive such results,231 someone
who requested the test, or pursuant to a court order.23 2 The Act allows
employers to disclose to a governmental agency admissions of criminal con-
218. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2008; 53 Fed. Reg. 41,506 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.35).
219. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2008(b)-(c).
220. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,506 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.30).
221. See id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.30(a)).
222. See id.
223. See id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.30(a)(1)).
224. See id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.30(a)(2)).
225. See id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.30(b)).
226. See id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.30(a)(4)).
227. See id.
228. See id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.30(c)).
229. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2008.
230. Id. § 2008(b)(1).
231. Id.
232. Id. § 2008(b)(2)-(3).
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duct by employees, but no other information. 23 3 The regulations also permit




The Secretary of Labor possesses the authority to seek injunctive relief
23
and assess civil penalties up to $10,000236 for violation of the Act or the
corresponding Department of Labor regulations. 237 Furthermore, the Poly-
graph Act creates, in favor of employees, a private right of action for dam-
ages or injunctive relief against employers who have violated the Act.238
In assessing the extent of the violation, and the penalty imposed, the Ad-
ministrator of the Wage and Hour Division (Administrator) must consider
several factors. 239 The Administrator may consider any past history of vio-
lating the Act, as well as the severity of the present violation. 240 The Ad-
ministrator may also consider the impact the violation has had on
employees,24' the existence of good faith compliance efforts by the em-
ployer,242 and the employer's explanation of the particular violation.243
Where a violation of the Act resulted from the conduct of the examiner, the
Administrator must evaluate whether the employer sought to ensure the ex-
aminer's compliance, and the foreseeability of the examiner's actions.2 44 Ul-
timately, the Polygraph Act subjects employers to liability not only under
the Act's enforcement provisions, but also under employees' private actions.
These actions include, but are not limited to, employment, reinstatement,
promotion, or payment of lost wages and benefits.245
233. Id. § 2008(c)(2); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 659, supra note 10, at 15, reprinted in 1988
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 754.
234. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,507 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.35(c)).
235. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2005(b) (West Supp. 1989).
236. Id. § 2005(a)(1); 53 Fed. Reg. 41,507 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 801.40(a)(2)). The regulations provide for immediate payment of the fine to the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor, by hand or mail delivery. Id. (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. § 801.43).
237. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,507 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.40(a)(2)). The regulations
provide that the Solicitor of Labor, or one of his authorized representatives, may be delegated
the authority to act in a civil action under the Act. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.41).
238. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2005(c).
239. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,507 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.42(b)).
240. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.42(b)(3)).
241. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.42(b)(2)).
242. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.42(b)(4)).
243. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.42(b)(6)).
244. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.42(b)(5)).
245. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 801.40(b)(1)); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 659, supra note
10, at 14, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 752, provides that "the
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III. THE EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH PROTECTION ACT: THE
DESTRUCTION OF THE FLIP OF THE COIN AND
THE DOUBLE STANDARD
A. The Polygraph Technique and How the Machine Works
While use of the polygraph as a workplace tool for detecting lies has
grown since 1978,246 society's use of truth eliciting devices originates from
more primitive periods in history.2 47 Methods of detecting lies have evolved
from primitive techniques such as the use of hot irons, trial by ordeal, and
the chewing of dry rice.24 Although truth verification today arguably ap-
pears more sophisticated,24 9 the theory that "changes in the subject's vital
signs indicate deception '  remains the same.
Truth verification through polygraphing involves attaching various de-
vices such as sphygmographs, pneumographic tubes, and electrodes to the
examinee's body.2"' The polygraph measures physiological changes induced
by the fear of lying such as changes in the pulse rate, blood pressure, skin
moisture, perspiration results, and respiratory rate.2 52 However, proper in-
terpretation of these changes to distinguish between truthfulness and lying
rests in the hands of the examiner.
Prior to administration of the test, polygraph examiners conduct a "pre-
test interview"2 5 3 aimed at eliminating "any element of surprise from the
actual testing" as well as neutralizing any adverse factors.254 During the
255 256actual testing phase,'" examiners ask examinees three types of questions.Control questions seek a deceptive response to act as a measuring tool
enforcement provisions are not to be construed as a limitation upon private actions being
brought under current law." Yet, the regulations provide that an action alleging a violation of
the Act must be commenced within three years of the date of the violation. Furthermore, the
court, at its discretion, may award attorneys fees. 29 U.S.C. § 2005(c)(2)-(3).
246. Gardner, supra note 5, at 320.
247. Id. at 297.
248. Id.; Weimer, Common Law Remedies of Employees Injured by Employer Use of Poly-
graph Testing, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 51, 52 (1987).
249. Gardner, supra note 5, at 297.
250. Weimer, supra note 248, at 52.
251. Supra note 2; Weimer, supra note 248, at 52.
252. Gardner, supra note 5, at 297-98; Weimer, supra note 248, at 52. In other words,
"[t]he current theory ... is that fear of being detected in a lie affects the bodily functions in a
way that can be recorded on a graph." Weimer, supra note 248, at 53 (citing Nagle, The
Polygraph in the Workplace, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 43, 46 (1983)).
253. See supra notes 183-97 and accompanying text.
254. Hurd, supra note 2, at 531 (quoting Comment, Privacy: The Polygraph in Employ-
ment, 30 ARK. L. REv. 35, 36 (1976)).
255. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
256. Hurd, supra note 2, at 531; Gardner, supra note 5, at 298.
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against subsequent responses.25 7 Irrelevant questions seek a truthful answer
for similar purposes.258 Relevant questions, however, aim directly at the
examination itself and the area in question.2 59 Although examiners then cat-
egorize the response, ultimately the validity of the polygraph and the exami-
nation "assumes a correlation exists between prevarication and physiological
responses. It further assumes th[e]se changes are measured objectively by
truth verification techniques and interpreted accurately by examiners. 
26
0
B. The Accuracy Debate
The Polygraph Act bans the use of the polygraph as a preemployment
screening device, 261 eliminating private employers' ability to ferret out the
"undesirables, ' '262 while encouraging more reliable methods of screening
and internal control. 263 However, the effectiveness of the Act as a protective
measure depends on the effectiveness of the polygraph.2M While limiting
private employers' use of polygraphs because of its inherent unreliability,
265
the Act establishes a double standard allowing the use of the polygraph
under certain circumstances.266 In other words, passage of the Act amounts
to at least partial acceptance of the polygraph. By permitting the use of the
polygraph in any context, Congress implicitly recognizes its reliability.
267
In enacting the statute, Congress recognized the unreliability of the device
and seemingly credited the theory that use of the polygraph in the preem-
ployment screening context leads to arbitrary results.268 Scientific research
indicates that the device possesses no inherent qualities of scientific valid-
ity.269 For example, both the American Medical Association and the Amer-
ican Psychological Association denounce the polygraph test due to the lack
257. Hurd, supra note 2, at 531; Gardner, supra note 5, at 298.
258. Hurd, supra note 2, at 531; Gardner, supra note 5, at 298.
259. Hurd, supra note 2, at 531; Gardner, supra note 5, at 298.
260. Gardner, supra note 5, at 298.
261. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2002 (West Supp. 1989).
262. Note, supra note 3, at 953.
263. Id.
264. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
265. Id.
266. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006.
267. Note, supra note 3, at 938. "Ironically, such an assumption amounts to deception in
itself, because the infallibility has yet to be proved." Id.
268. See 133 CONG. REC. H9529 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987) (statement of Rep. Wheat); S.
REP. No. 284, supra note 6, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 733-34.
269. S. REP. No. 284, supra note 6, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 733; Gardner, supra note 5, at 316; Note, supra note 3, at 933-34; Craver, supra note 17, at
33. But see Note, supra note 3, at 941-42 (citing RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVI-
DENCE § 10.5 (Supp. 1963): "scientific infallibility should be no more a prerequisite to the
introduction of lie detector tests than to the admissibility of other scientific evidence dependent
[Vol. 39:235
Employee Polygraph Protection Act
of evidence supporting its validity in the workplace.27° Although the Act
aims to reduce the coercive nature of the exam, one of the primary factors
leading to unreliability,27" ' the device's accuracy in employment situations
produces results no better than the flip of a coin.272 The polygraph test tar-
nishes the reputation of innocent persons as often as it pinpoints thieves.273
The polygraph measures physical reactions, such as blood pressure and heart
beat, not truth or falsity.274 By granting exemptions, the Polygraph Act
presupposes that under limited circumstances the inherently unreliable poly-
graph may be transformed into a sound instrument.275 Yet, the polygraph is
either reliable or it is not.276
In addition to the inability of the polygraph to "detect lies," various other
factors affect the accuracy of results.277 In interpreting test results, the emo-
tional and physical condition of examinees assumes a significant role.2 7' Be-
cause the polygraph as an instrument records numerous physiological
variables, such as the heart rate,279 blood pressure, and respiration rate, an
assumption of the polygraph's reliability equally assumes that all liars react
in a universal manner to questions presented in a lie detector exam. 280 How-
ever, individuals react differently to questions posed in a test.281 While accu
upon expert analysis, such as handwriting analysis, fingerprinting, ballistics, and diagnosis by
physicians and psychiatrists"); see also Nagle, supra note 21, at 43; Hurd, supra note 2, at 540.
270. Letter from American Psychological Association to Pat Williams (Nov. 3, 1987), re-
printed in 133 CONG. REC. E4348 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987).
271. Gardner, supra note 5, at 301 n.37. By making it unlawful for an employer to require,
request, cause or even suggest that an employee submit to a polygraph, the Act limits the
coercive nature of the exam. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
272. Comment, supra note 1, at 555; 133 CONG. REC. H9550 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987)
(statement of Rep. Neal).
273. 133 CONG. REC. H9532 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987) (statement of Rep. Jeffords).
274. See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
275. See 133 CONG. REC. H9595-96 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987) (statement of Rep. Young); S.
REP. No. 284, supra note 6, at 749 (minority view of Sen. Thurmond), reprinted in 1988 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 749.
276. See 133 CONG. REC. H9578 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987) (statement of Rep. Jacobs)
("Either the gun shoots bullets or blanks. It (sic] it shoots bullets, it may be useful; and if it
shoots blanks and impugns the reputation of a thoroughly honest citizen .. .then it is not
useful.").
277. Note, supra note 37, at 1412-13.
278. Gardner, supra note 5, at 303.
279. Letter from American Medical Association to Pat Williams (Oct. 30, 1987), reprinted
in 133 CONG. REC. E4348 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987) [hereinafter AMA Letter to Pat Williams].
280. 133 CONG. REC. H9564 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987) (statement of Rep. Bartlett).
281. Castagnera-Cain, supra note 22, at 205.
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rate results depend on fear of detection2 2 no physiological response unique
to lying exists.
2 3
Moreover, physiological responses may result from fear, anxiety, nervous-
ness or other physiological and mental abnormalities.28 4 For example, ex-
aminees' resentment of the examination proceeding, as well as the highly
personal questions asked, may make truthful responses indistinguishable
from deceptive ones.28 5
The structure and substance of the questions asked during a polygraph
exam may also influence the outcome of the test.28 6 As a general rule, di-
recting specific questions to examinees leads to more accurate test results.
28 7
Under the Act, questions that are "unnecessarily intrusive" or "degrading"
are prohibited.288 Polygraph examiners may not inquire into irrelevant mat-
ters such as religion, 281 racial concerns,
290 politics, 2 91 sexual preferences,
292
or union sentiments.29 3 Yet, while naturally intrusive, control questions and
irrelevant questions serve a vital function in developing valid interpretations
of exam results. 294 Examiners compare responses to control questions, as-
sumed to be answered truthfully, with responses to relevant questions in or-
der to identify the "guilty" subjects.2 95 Thus, assuming acceptance of the
reliability of the polygraph, as the Act appears to do under limited circum-
stances, 296 the control questions become vital to ensuring the polygraph's
282. Gardner, supra note 5, at 303; Comment, supra note 1, at 561; Note, supra note 37, at
1412.
283. AMA Letter to Pat Williams, supra note 279. The assumption that "having elec-
trodes strapped to your head and being interrogated like a criminal," 133 CONG. REC. H9574
(daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987) (statement of Rep. Owens), decisively separates stress related to decep-
tion from "fear, anger, frustration, or humiliation" appears unwarranted. 133 CONG. REC.
H9544 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987) (statement of Rep. Rahall).
284. Gardner, supra note 5, at 303; Hurd, supra note 2, at 530.
285. Gardner, supra note 5, at 303.
286. AMA Letter to Pat Williams, supra note 279. Furthermore, "[w]hile an applicant
who has failed the test may not be able to reverse the resulting negative hiring decision, knowl-
edge of the test results would enable him or her to make a more informed decision with regard
to both consent to future testing and objections to particular questions." Hurd, supra note 2,
at 549. The Act allows disclosure of the results of an exam to the examinee. 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 2008(a). Yet, this better late than never approach clearly offers little consolation to an indi-
vidual who has suffered adverse consequences as a result of the exam outcome.
287. Note, supra note 37, at 1417.
288. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(b)(1)(B).
289. Id. § 2007(b)(1)(C)(i).
290. Id. § 2007(b)(1)(C)(ii).
291. Id. § 2007(b)(l)(C)(iii).
292. Id. § 2007(b)(l)(C)(iv).
293. Id. § 2007(b)(I)(C)(v).
294. Weimer, supra note 248, at 77.
295. Id.
296. See supra notes 261-76 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 39:235
Employee Polygraph Protection Act
validity. However, the Act compromises the critical nature of the control
questions in favor of limiting the "probing" of what it assumes to be an
accurate tool.
Further, the individual skill and training of examiners also affects the reli-
ability of a polygraph.2 97 Clearly, "bells do not go off" at the moment some-
one tells a lie.298 Rather, the polygraph's ability to discern the truth rests in
the skill of examiners. 299 "Although an adequate instrument is essential for
proper testing, the role of the examiner in interviewing the examinee, design-
ing test questions, and evaluating and interpreting the polygram is much
more critical to an accurate diagnosis than is the mechanical function of the
polygraph itself."3" Thus, the skill of examiners fundamentally affects the
ultimate reliability of the test.3°1
The Polygraph Act outlines provisions designed to promote examiner
competency by binding examiners to respect examinees' rights, and also by
establishing qualifications for examiners.3 °2 Under the Act, the pre-test
phase of the exam3 3 aids examiners in eliminating unreliable variables that
decrease accuracy." Reviewing proposed questions 305 ensures clarity of
questions and precludes any element of surprise during the testing. 306 The
Act further seeks to ensure examiner competence and to limit innate exam-
iner bias 307 by strictly limiting test analysis to the scope of the exam.30 8
Moreover, perhaps in an effort to' further increase reliability, the Act re-
quires examiners to maintain systematic files of all exam reports or
records.30 9 However, despite these attempts to cure the underlying ailments
of the polygraph and its administration, the provisions of the statute fall
short of establishing a remedy.
297. See supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text.
298. Weimer, supra note 248, at 52.
299. Gardner, supra note 5, at 304 ("The most important factor involved in the use of any
• . . [lie detection] instrument is the ability, experience, education and integrity of the exam-
iner.") (footnote omitted) (quoting J. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION: THE
POLYGRAPH ("LIE-DETECTOR") TECHNIQUE 5 (2d ed. 1977)); Note, supra note 25, at 99.
300. Note, supra note 48, at 331 (footnote omitted) (quoting J. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH
AND DECEPTION: THE POLYGRAPH ("LIE-DETECTOR") TECHNIQUE 235 (1966)).
301. See Note, supra note 3, at 934.
302. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(c).
303. Id. § 2007(b)(2).
304. Hurd, supra note 2, at 531.
305. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(b)(2)(E).
306. Hurd, supra note 2, at 531 (citing Comment, Privacy: The Polygraph in Employment,
30 ARK. L. REV. 35, 36 (1976)); Note, supra note 48, at 331.
307. See generally Tiner & O'Grady, supra note 50, at 100.
308. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(c)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).
309. Id. § 2007(c)(2)(B).
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Clearly, the Act ignores the uncertainty that human error may contribute
to lie detection fallibility.3 'l  Attempts to bind examiners to strict rules ig-
nores reality because polygraph examiners arguably do not base their diag-
nosis on the records alone.3 11 Polygraphers tend to find deception more
often than not to preserve their own job security.3 12 Furthermore, mere es-
tablishment of written requirements can not eradicate the widespread subjec-
tiveness that goes into analyzing polygraphs.3 13 Thus, although the Act
establishes requirements and qualifications for examiners, these provisions
do not guarantee reliability. Moreover, even though the Act delegates the
authority to establish licensing laws to the states,3 14 thereby responding to
federalism concerns while confirming federal dominion over regulation of
the device, 1 5 the Act ironically fails to promulgate the federal standards
necessary to ensure examiner competency3 16 and examination accuracy. 17
C. Mental Strip Searches: Invasion of Privacy
318
Not only may the Polygraph Act face attack based upon its vacillation as
to the reliability of the polygraph,31 9 but the Act may equally infringe on the
constitutional right to privacy. 320 The lie detector has been labeled as intru-
sive,321 resulting in the degradation of human dignity. 22 However, the Act
both denounces its use in the prescreening context and approves its use
310. 133 CONG. REC. H9548 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987) (statement of Rep. Martinez).
311. Carr, supra note 7, at 702.
312. Note, supra note 4, at 812.
313. Gardner, supra note 5, at 305; Weimer, supra note 248, at 57.
314. 134 CONG. REC. S1727 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Sen. Cochran).
315. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 284, supra note 6, at 57 (minority view of Sen. Quayle), reprinted
in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 745.
316. Yet, even if the Act did take such a step, "[i]f every examiner had the integrity of a
Boy Scout, the problems inherent in the technology of the polygraph would not go away." 134
CONG. REC. H9544 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1988) (citing Jussim, Lies, Damn Lies - And Polygraphs,
NATION (Dec. 21, 1985)).
317. Note, supra note 37, at 1432; Comment, supra note 1, at 553.
318. Although the Constitution has not explicitly recognized a specific right to privacy,
credence has been given to zones of privacy based on the first, fourth, fifth, ninth and
fourteenth amendments. Wiseman, supra note 4, at 33-34; Note, supra note 25, at 103.
Although not addressed in this Note, the use of a polygraph may infringe on constitutional
guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures, Wiseman, supra note 4, at 37-45, and
the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 46-50.
319. See supra notes 261-76 and accompanying text.
320. In order to claim constitutional protection with respect to submission to a lie detector
test, it is necessary as a prerequisite to show state action. While generally reserved to the
public sector, at least one commentator would extend this showing to the private sphere.
Hurd, supra note 2, at 545-46 (citing Friedman, Corporate Power, Government By Private
Groups, and the Law, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 155, 176 (1957)).
321. Note, supra note 37, at 1417.
322. See supra note 9.
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under the exemptions. Thus, the Act makes an arguably unwarranted dis-
tinction between the polygraph's effectiveness based on the employment set-
ting in which it is used.
The Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights has defined privacy as
"the right of the individual to decide for himself, with only extraordinary
exceptions in the interest of the whole society, when and under what condi-
tions his thoughts, speech, and acts should be revealed to others." '32 3 Use of
the polygraph may invade individual privacy in two ways.324 First, the poly-
graph exam subjects examinees to questions which destroy all their defenses
and open their internal thoughts and personality to examiners' inspection.325
Second, the inability to halt the "production line of dossiers" divulging exam
results further humbles the subjects.326
Under the Polygraph Act, the provisions for examinee rights and disclo-
sure of test results seek to minimize intrusion upon privacy.3 27 By circum-
scribing permissible questions to specific, relevant areas, rather than
allowing polygraphers to delve into highly personal matters, the Act at-
tempts to shield the examinees' mental processes from invasion.328 More-
over, by limiting disclosure of records and documents obtained from
examinations to a handful of authorized individuals, 329 the Act further seeks
to protect the privacy rights of tested employees, 330 erecting a barrier against
external dissemination.
While these provisions reduce the intrusiveness of the polygraph test, they
fail to eliminate intrusiveness altogether. Although questioning an employee
about his conduct on the job33 1 would not rise to the level of a constitutional
323. Hermann, supra note 5, at 127-28 (citing Hearings on Psychological Testing Procedures
and the Rights of Federal Employees Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965)).
324. Gardner, supra note 5, at 305-06; Note, supra note 37, at 1417.
325. Gardner, supra note 5, at 305-06; Note, supra note 37, at 1417.
326. Gardner, supra note 5, at 305-06; Note, supra note 37, at 1417; Note, supra note 4, at
814. In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), the Supreme Court recognized that there are two
interests attached to the right of privacy, "[o]ne interest comprises personal decisions made by
an individual," Wiseman, supra note 4, at 53, "the other embraces 'the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters.'" Id. (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600).
327. See infra notes 328-31 and accompanying text.
328. "If there is a quintessential zone of human privacy it is the mind. Our ability to
exclude others from our mental processes is intrinsic to the human personality." Wiseman,
supra note 4, at 59 (citing Long Beach City Employees Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 719 P.2d
660, 663 (Cal. 1986)).
329. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2008 (West Supp. 1989); supra notes 229-34 and accompanying text.
330. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 659, supra note 10, at 15, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 726.
331. Weimer, supra note 248, at 76. The employer argues that an employee in effect con-
sents to being polygraphed by seeking employment. Hurd, supra note 2, at 546.
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deprivation of privacy, the polygraph's ability to probe the mind does not
end at this point. Rather, at the moment a subject is hooked up to the
"truth-telling" device, his responses, vital or not, are recorded.332 Clearly,
the test's lack of reliability and the severe impairment of an individual's right
to privacy outweigh any minimal benefits or rational purpose the Act poses
for establishing a system of second-class citizens.333
D. The Double Standard: The Exemptions
In promulgating exemptions, 334 the Act, attempting to follow a balanced
approach preserving responsible and necessary use of the polygraph, estab-
lishes a double standard.335 While the Act restricts the use of the polygraph
due to its lack of accuracy, the fact that it permits the use of the polygraph
under the exemptions appears contradictory. 336 Thus, in enacting the Act,
Congress permits government administration of polygraphs, but prohibits
private sector use of such tests except in very narrow circumstances.
Generally, employers rely solely on lie detector results as determinative of
employees' "guilt" or "innocence., 337 While language requiring corrobora-
tive evidence for disciplinary action reduces such a risk,338 the Act fails to
anticipate the effect of this provision. Although employers may no longer
rely solely on polygraph results, the Act may permit them to rely in part on
the results. Furthermore, the Act leaves unsanctioned employers' manufac-
turing of corroborative evidence to satisfy this need.339 Clearly, nothing
332. See, e.g., Weimer, supra note 248, at 77. "The individual thus becomes an object,
stripped of volition, subject to a probe of his essence." Wiseman, supra note 4, at 33.
333. See Note, supra note 103, at 415. Others may counter, however, that a thief, for
example, has no right to privacy. Note, supra note 3, at 947, n. 107 (citing The Polygraph in
Labor Disputes, COUNS. POLYGRAPH EXAMINERS NEWSL., 10 (reprint 1965)). The truth ver-
ification techniques are
an insidious search of the human mind and are a breach of the most fundamental of
human rights. They provide a vehicle of excursion into the most private recesses of
the human mind. Even if the polygraph testing was trustworthy, there is still no
possible justification for such 'mental wiretapping.'
Gardner, supra note 5, at 323 (quoting REPORT ON THE USE OF POLYGRAPHS AS "LIE DE-
TECTORS" BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BASED ON A STUDY BY THE FOREIGN OPERA-
TIONS AND GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, H.R. REP. No. 198, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1965) (statement
of Rep. Cornelius Gallagher)).
334. See supra notes 89-148 and accompanying text.
335. See 133 CONG. REC. H9535 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987) (statement of Rep. Fawell); S.
REP. No. 284, supra note 6, at 61 (minority views of Sen. Thurmond), reprinted in 1988 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 749.
336. See generally Comment, supra note 1, at 553; Note, supra note 3, at 936.
337. Note, supra note 3, at 935.
338. Supra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
339. 134 CONG. REC. S1715 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Sen. Boschwitz).
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within the provisions of the Act prevents employers from taking this action
and concurrently circumventing the Act.
The Act not only fails to anticipate the effects of its provisions prohibiting
adverse disciplinary actions, but also overlooks problems inherent in the ex-
emptions. For example, citing the validity of polygraph results used in con-
nection with investigations of specific incidents,34 Congress disregarded the
lack of effectiveness of polygraph use in deterring or detecting ongoing theft
in the workplace. 341 Furthermore, under all the exemptions, due to the pos-
sibility of litigation over the validity of using a polygraph in a particular
context, as well as the severity of the enforcement provisions,342 "employers
[may] have no alternative but to abstain from all testing. '343
In promulgating exemptions for public sector employers, 3 " for employers
in the national defense and security industries,345 for those employers pro-
viding private security services, 34 6 as well as for employers authorized to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled substances, 34 7 Congress ac-
ted under the guise of balancing individual interests with the public inter-
est 348 and "asserted a compelling need for access to the polygraph., 349 In
order to protect the national interest, or sensitive information, 350 to deter
drug trafficking, 351 or merely to ensure trust and responsibility among public
employees,35 2 the Act entrusts the security and welfare of the nation to a
device arguably bereft of scientific reliability.353
Despite attempts to "strike a blow for fairness" and balance individual
interests with public interests,354 the Act's reservation of the "privilege" of
polygraph use to the exemptions thwarts the public interest by setting up a
340. See supra note 110.
341. 133 CONG. REC. H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987) (statement of Rep. Martinez).
342. See supra notes 235-45 and accompanying text.
343. Letter from David E. Nagle to Mr. Powell A. Moore, of Ginn, Edington, Moore, &
Wade, reprinted in 134 CONG. REC. S1690 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988).
344. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(b) (West Supp. 1989).
345. Id. § 2006(b).
346. Id. § 2006(b).
347. Id. § 2006(f).
348. The suggestion arises that public employees waive constitutional rights in exchange
for public employment. Note, supra note 334, at 414.
349. 133 CONG. REC. H9560 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987) (statement of Rep. Roukema).
350. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 659, supra note 10, at 12, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 750.
351. 133 CONG. REC. H9573 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987) (statement of Rep. Richardson).
352. Note, supra note 333, at 420 n.l 18.
353. See supra notes 261-317 and accompanying text. Clearly, spies and terrorists may slip
through a lie detector test. See 133 CONG. REC. H9555 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987) (statement of
Rep. Williams).
354. 133 CONG. REC. H9560 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987) (statement of Rep. Roukema).
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double standard.355 If the polygraph is void of scientific reliability, its use in
the public sector does not cure its fallibility. Rather, any distinction between
the private and public sectors on this ground appears hypocritical.356 Cer-
tainly, congressional approval cannot somehow transform the polygraph
from an unreliable instrument to a reliable one.35 7 In the end, rather than
serving the public interest by eliminating unbridled polygraph use, the Act
may result in increased claims of privacy invasion,358 as well as equal protec-
tion claims 359 by employees subject to the probing of the metal box.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Polygraph Act prohibits the use of a lie detector during the applica-
tion procedure or as a means of sporadically checking current employees. In
promulgating exemptions, the Act compromises its basic premise that the
polygraph is unreliable. In addition, the Act invites constitutional chal-
lenges asserting privacy violations and lack of equal protection. Despite at-
tempts to "strike a blow for fairness" in the workplace by balancing the
property interests of employers with the privacy and dignity interests of em-
ployees, the Act effectively eliminates the employers' rights to utilize poly-
graph testing under the exemptions. However, this result is arguably for the
best because "[t]he polygraph is a pernicious instrument that has been seized
upon by a society obsessed with gadgetry. It should be relegated to a Smith-
sonian Institution exhibit case as a monument to an American craze.""
Yvonne Koontz Sening
355. "[O]ften in the law we use a balancing test. We recognize that the need for something
is so great that we use the best helpful means at our disposal, even though it may not be
perfect." 133 CONG. REC. H9566 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987) (statement of Rep. Roukema).
356. If the polygraph is unreliable it should not be imposed on any employee. See 133
CONG. REC. H9577 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987) (statement of Rep. Jacobs).
357. Id.
358. See supra notes 318-33 and accompanying text.
359. In Long Beach City Employers Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, the California Supreme
Court held that requiring a public employee to submit to a polygraph test intrudes upon the
individual's privacy and unconstitutionally denies the public employee equal protection of the
law. 41 Cal. 3d 937, 956, 719 P.2d 660, 672, 227 Cal. Rptr. 90, 102 (1986).
360. Note, supra note 3, at 937 (citing Musler, Trial By Gadget, 199 NATION 159 (Sept. 28,
1964)).
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